The sharhs and hashiyahs written on al-Zamakhshari's (d. 538/1144) al-Kashshāf formed an effective writing tradition and are connected to each other in terms of influence, quotation, rejection, objection, and answering. However, the commentators often provided explanations of the information related in the previous works without citing any specific author. Therefore, these relations can only become apparent via chronological and comparative analyses. This study examines these texts, which are mostly in manuscript form, both chronologically and comparatively in the context of the nature of the science of tafsīr. Al-Zamakhsharī explained his view on the nature of tafsīr in the introduction to his al-Kashshāf. This article, which presents a chronological study of the subsequent works in which these explanations were annotated, details how later scholars dealt with this subject. The selected section shows that the sharhs and hashiyahs do not reflect the widespread belief that such works were merely repetitions of each other, but that they were subjected to intense debates that matured over time. The following points are noted: There is no consensus on the definition of tafsīr, the critical approach is constantly in the foreground, and any serious study of the sharhs and hashiyahs on al-Kashshāf is only possible when one consults works of historical depth.
Introduction
T he equivalence of the envisaged terms of the classic philosophy of science, such as subject (mawḍū'), principles (mabadī), and matters (masāil), to the science of tafsīr (Qur'anic exegesis) is widely debated. This science analyses the Qur'ānic verses (āyāt) in relation to the occasions of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl) , the abrogating and abrogated verses (nāsikh and mansūkh), siyāq and sibāq, reciting the Qur'ān in terms of manner and method of pronunciation(qirā'a), pronunciation, lexical meaning, word structure, syntactic analysis, discourse, and intention/communicative intention. This analysis is connected to various scholarly approaches: history, prophetic history (siyār) and hadith from the perspective of a historical approach; to lexicography, etymology (ishtiqāq), the sciences of morphology and syntax (ṣarf and naḥw) in terms of a linguistic approach; to ma'ānī (the semantics of Arabic syntax), bayān (the theory of imagery or the theory of figure of speech), and badī' (the science of rhetorical figures) in terms of a literary approach; and to the sciences that use the Qur'ān as a source of knowledge, among them fiqh, theology, and Sufism in terms of determining the text's intention. If we adjoin all these approaches, it is hard to refer to an exegetical activity per se. At this point, some questions arise: How did Qur'ānic exegesis acquire the qualifications to become an idiosyncratic science? How did it gather different matters related to various sciences under a single topic? What kind of principles does it have? How were these principles developed? These questions were revived during the period of Islamic intellectual history (i.e., the muta'akhirīn), when for the first time they were transformed into doctrinal discussions within the sharḥ and ḥāshiya (annotation) literature. This genre has yet to find its deserved place in the field of contemporary exegesis historiography.
Zamakhsharī's (d. 538/1144) explanations of the nature of the science of the Qur'ānic exegesis, which appear in the introduction of his al-Kashshāf, have been broadly analysed in sharḥ and ḥāshiya literatures. Inserting some of the works used as a source for this debate carries these analyses a step further. During this process of evolution, it is remarkable to see how Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1364) defines the science of tafsīr and introduces his views on the division between tafsīr and ta 'wīl, how Akmaladdīn al-Bābartī (d. 786/1384) Musannifak (d. 875/1470) dep-recatorily rejects these views after quoting all of Fanārī's explanations, and how he examines al-Tībī's (d. 743/1342) explanations as well as Bābartī's on tafsīr and ta'wīl. However, it is hard to reveal the above-mentioned chronological relation between these sources, for the commentators (shāriḥs and muḥashshīs) involved in this activity did not refer to the authors while discussing the subject. As the names are mostly not stated alongside the aforementioned objections and responses, obtaining a deep historical knowledge of these sources involves subjecting them to a chronological and comparative reading.
In this article, al-Kashshāf's sharḥs and ḥāshiyas will be examined chronologically and comparatively by framing the nature of the science of Qur'ānic exegesis, as the literature on al-Kashshāf created a strong tradition in this field. First, the main text will present the discussion on the nature of the science of tafsīr, which will be followed by two different grammatical analyses of this main text. Subsequently, the sharḥ and ḥāshiya sources involving the relevant discussion will be elaborated to demonstrate the extent of the interaction, recognition, rejection, objection, and response that occurred among these sources. Finally, to discover each source's contribution to this discussion and to reflect the historical process holistically, we will mention other sharḥ and ḥāshiya works that make no contribute to this particular discussion.
About the Nature of the Science of Tafsır in the Main Text
Zamakhsharī explains his views about tafsīr in the introduction of his al-Kashshāf, which can be divided into four parts with regard to the subject's coherence: (1) ḥamdalah (a phrase in the meaning of "praise to God"), (2) ṣalwalah (the prayer for the Prophet), (3) about the Qur'ānic exegesis, and (4) the purpose of the work. Here, we are interested in the third part, in which he stated the significant aspects of 'ilm (science/knowledge) and ṣanā'ah (craft). According to him, acquiring knowledge about the generic subjects of a science does not require any special effort and capability. Accordingly, this does not lead to sharp distinctions among scholars. But in the field of sciences, there are fine and impressive precisions, exquisite meanings subjected to fine thoughts, and cryptic, mysterious secrets that can be understood only by few eminent persons.
1 Zamakhsharī argues that such aspects, which exhibit the differences and capabilities, mostly fall into the systematics of 1 Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqāiqi al-tanzīl ve uyūn' al-akāwīl fī vujūh al-ta'wīl (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1366 /1947 , I, 2.
Qur'ānic exegesis. After stating this, he explains the requisite qualifications that a person needs to reach before diving into this science:
Now, among the sciences, only tafsīr includes the impressive precisions that have not been unearthed; delicate secrets in sheltered places. Tafsīr is completely filled with things covering capabilities and the ideas prevailing within mature minds. As Jāhiz mentions Naẓmu al-Qur'ān, not every qualified scholar can throw himself into this science and contemplate upon it, even if a jurist takes precedence over his peers in the knowledge of fatwā and aḥkām; or a theologian has an edge on the art of theology over everyone in this world; or someone memorises stories and reports far better than Ibn al-Qirriyya; or even if a preacher is far more impressive than Ḥasan al-Baṣrī; or someone is more competent than Sībawayḥ in syntax; or a lexicographer sets tongues wagging the wordsnone of them would be considered a connoisseur who takes to the roads to the Qur'ānic exegesis with the aim to immerse himself in the Qur'ān's essence. The only one who can be connoisseur on this topic is he who has a voice in the two sciences particular to the Qur'ān (i.e., ma'ānī and bayān) and patiently pursues them for a long time. While working on both, this person undertakes exacting investigations and analyses the roots of ma'ānī and bayān in order to obtain the knowledge of the excellence of God's argumentations (ḥujja) and works with passion to reveal the Prophet's miracle. However, before starting this process, this person, who has already acquired [sufficient] knowledge of the other sciences, must conduct the abovementioned investigations with memorising, discuss [them] for a long time [with his peers], interact with qualified scholars and people, reject and be rejected in the debates, be the safeguard of the science of 'irāb (an Arabic term for the system of nominal, adjectival, or verbal suffixes of Classical Arabic), and be a prominent scholar who knows about al-Kitāb (by Sībawayh). In addition, his nature has to be prone to master the sciencesand mild, be like a fire [with respect to comprehension], be sharp so that ideally he is able to understand a secret signification even if it is tiny, be alert to ambiguous implicitness, and neither be closed and cold or rough and unpleasant. He must know and use the style of poetry and prosaism, not an apprentice but a fully educated person with respect to producing results by the process of thinking. He must be one who has learned how to compose words and compile, and how to use the best stylistic devices for effective writing. He has so many times met with difficulties in writing [his opinions] and has faced up to many difficulties.
2
According to this passage tafsīr is the leading science, one in which the person can demonstrate his mastery and capabilities. Zamakhsharī asserts that one must master the science of balāgha (eloquence or rhetoric) in order to develop more depth in the exegetical sphere. According to him, even someone who reaches the peak of knowledge in other sciences that contribute to tafsīr cannot become a leading figure in tafsīr unless he masters balāgha. Moreover, competence in balāgha is 2
Ibid., I, 2-3.
not sufficient, for the mufassir has to become an expert in the science of syntax, study other sciences, and be educated and experienced in thinking and using the Arabic language. In addition to these obtainable qualifications, some innate (wahbī) qualifications that can be summed up as "being sharp and perspicacious" are also required.
In the quotation above, both the second sentence and the ones after it are subjected to various grammatical analyses in the tradition of sharḥ-ḥāshiya. We prefer the analysis that leads to the above translation, namely, there is no quote from Jāhiz (d. 255/869), and the sentence starting with "namely…" until the end belongs to Zamakhsharī. In the sharḥ-ḥāshiya tradition, many significant commentators express their opinions to show their preference for this one, 3 among them Tībī, Sirājuddīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 745/1345), Imāduddīn al-Yamanī (d. 750/1349), Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī, Taftāzānī, Jurjānī, Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār, Musannifak, and Hasan Chalabi (d. 886/1481) . Nevertheless, Taftāzānī and Jurjānī did not report their exact opinion: "The author's statements contain transmission from Jāhiz's statements. This is not a secret to those who are even slightly familiar with the discourse". 4 There is definitely no transmission made from Jāhiz's statements.
5
According to those commentators who adopt the second analysis, such as Fahruddīn al-Chāpardī (d. 746/1345) and Bābartī, 6 the transmission is made from Jāhiz's Naẓm al-Qur'ān, which has been lost. Accordingly, the statements should be understood as: "… is the science of tafsīr". Not every scholar can dive into this science and contemplate upon it.
7 As Jāhiz mentions in his Naẓm al-Qur'ān, if a jurists comes to fore in the science of fatwā and aḥkām in comparison to his peers…". Various opinions are presented on the extent to which Jāhiz's statements have been continued to discuss. After all, for us the debate on whether or not there is a quotation is not significant because those who support its existence see the abovemen- 3 Sharafuddīn, 10 Also, Shīrāzī limited himself to the ḥamdala 11 and thus did not mention any of the explanations related to the nature of the science of tafsīr. On the other hand, instead of developing his own views into a debate, Chapardī only elaborated upon Zamakhsharī's statements in terms of lexicography, word structure, and syntactic analysis.
12 Chapardī's interpretation only deals with the relationship between tafsīr and balāgha. He explains the analysis of ma'ānī and bayān as two Qur'ānic sciences and states that applying them to the divine revelation, which is a literary miracle, will reveal deep meanings that cannot be obtained by investigating other texts. 13 Apart from this, Chapardī narrates the author's statements without deleting a single word from the main text, thereby making the entire text, in terms of its lexicography and sentence structure, understandable at a literal level.
Tībī, the next commentator, wrote his annotation later than Chapardī (note: Tībī died three years before him) used Chapardī's annotation but explains the part being studied in more detail. He quotes Wāhidī's declaration that, as regards the notions of tafsīr-ta'wīl, one is not allowed to express his opinion about relying upon ra'y (personal judgement/opinion).
14 Proclaiming this an extreme statement, he According to Tībī, the essence of this discussion is that tafsīr is based on riwāyah (report) and ta'wīl is based on dirāyah (reasoning/personal opinion). thus, the reports precluding ra'y from tafsīr should be interpreted appropriately.
When dealing with the Zamakhsharī's explanations of Zamakhsharī of ma'ānī and bayān, Tībī also separates ma'ānī from bayān and describes both of them. According to him, just because they pertaining both to the Qur'ān does not mean that they are restricted it. He therefore, tries to explain that ma'ānī and bayān have been applied to the Qur'ān in an entirely unique way. If the one wants to penetrate to the Qur'ān's mysteries, he is extremely indebted to them. 17 By quoting from Sakkākī's al-Miftāḥ and al-Kashshāf, Tībī indicates a commentator's obligation to master both sciences.
18
Apart from elucidating the tafsīr-ta'wīl and tafsīr-balāgha relationships in Tībī's annotation, the author mainly adopts a word-to-word approach to the main text. Thereby, this annotation is one of the works demonstrating a deep literal investigation of the text. Almost every subsequent annotation benefited from Tībī's explanations.
Sirājuddīn al-Qazwīnī also wrote an important annotation on Kashf al-Kashshāf by referring to Tībī. Although this commentary became an important source for significant theological debates, it is irrelevant to the matter under discussion here. In general, his comments are also at literal level. Moreover, Tībī's commentary recapitulates the rest of them.
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15 Tībī, I, I, 650. 17 Ibid., I, 661. 18 Ibid., I, f. 2 b -3 a .
The next sharḥ belongs to 'Imāduddīn al-Yamanī, who mostly based his work on Tībī's Futūḥ al-Ghayb. Over the time, this work transformed itself to a compendium upon Tībī's commentary. However, Yamanī distinguishes himself from both Tībī's work and the rest of the sharḥ and ḥāshiya tradition by adopting the Mu'tazilite position in the theological discussion. If we look at that part in the sharḥ, including the subject of the science of tafsīr 20 , we see that he summarised most of Tībī's arguments and that his own contribution are few and unremarkable. One reason for this could be that the commentators were discussing this particular subject were not interested in theological debates. Therefore, he might not have felt the need to distinguish himself from Tībī's sharḥ.
Another commentator, Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī, wrote a distinctive and effective commentary. He introduces a brief in his work on the part related to our interest:
Shortly and precisely, the idea is that those who are competent in the science and craft are close to each other or at the same level in terms mastering the principles of the sciences and the origins of the crafts in which they are interested. The differentiation and superiority among them come into question within the sphere of refinement and impressive precision. Only those who are unique individuals and pioneers recognise this refinement and impressive precision. Only the science of Qur'ānic exegesis involves many refinements and impressive precisions. [Hence,] not every scholar can enhance [these refinements and impressive precisions], but only those who know the sciences of ma'ānī and bayān and who study hard in order to apply both to the matters stand out from the rest of the scholars.
21
After mentioning this, Rāzī indicates that while Zamakhsharī talks about "those who are condemned by attitude of imitation", he refers to scholars and craftsmen in general and also perhaps to some mufassirs. Indeed, some of the mufassirs confine themselves to reports because they do not allow reasoning and personal opinion. After introducing the well-known report for this prohibition, Rāzī starts to criticise them:
The Qur'ān was revealed with the stylistic features of spoken Arabic [at that time]. Arabic has [verified] In the following part, and for the first time in the sharḥ and ḥāshiya tradition, he describes the science of tafsīr and then moves on to the subjects of tafsīr and ta'wīl:
Tafsīr is the science that searches for the will (murād) of God almighty in the Qur'ān. It is divided into tafsīr and ta'wīl because the Qur'ān is expounded either by transmitting (riwāyah) the explanation of what the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) and his Companions (r.a.) meant (tafsīr) or explained by Arabic's principles (ta'wīl). In short, tafsīr is connected to riwāyah and ta'wīl is connected to dirāyah.
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Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī was the first commentator who worked within the shar-ḥ-ḥāshiya tradition to introduce a compact distinction between tafsīr and ta'wīl by describing tafsīr. His views were later reviewed and completed by Alāuddīn Alī Pehliwān and Taftāzānī, criticised by Bābartī and Molla Fanārī, and defended by Abdaljabbār and Mussanifak.
After his description of tafsīr, Rāzī attributes the reason of why ma'ānī and bayān are peculiar to tafsīr to the concept that both attested to the Qur'ān in terms of reaching the level of 'ijāz (inimitability of the Qur'ān) with balāgha. 24 In contrast to other commentators, he then dwells broadly on the definition of ma'ānī and bayān, as well as the differences between them, so they can be subjected to individual research.
25 Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār later criticised him for doing so. 26 After Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī, Alauddīn Alī Pahliwān wrote a more concise sharḥ with the benefit of his follower's annotation. Although the exact date of Pahliwān's death is unknown, we do know that he wrote his annotation after Rāzī. In fact, it is highly likely that he wrote it before Taftāzānī and Jurjānī wrote their works. 27 In it, he adds to Rāzī's definition of tafsīr as "a science by which the will of Allah almighty in the Qur'ān is searched". Pahliwān wrote "a science by which the will of Allah almighty in the Qur'ān or His possible intention is searched" 28 to include the notion of ta'wīl mentioned in the tafsīr-ta'wīl division. Hence, he remarks that the definition's first part indicates tafsīr based on riwāyah and that its second part is ta'wīl based on dirāyah, 29 which means that the divine will cannot be exactly determined. Pahliwān's annotation contains no other comments on this subject. As will be seen below, these additional words will appear in Molla Fanārī's definition of tafsīr.
Bābartī wrote an important annotation on al-Kashshāf by considering the commentaries Tībī, Kazwīnī, and Rāzī. In the part related to our subject, he quotes Rāḍī's explanations on tafsīr with reasoning word-by-word, as stated above. 30 In his definition of tafsīr, the eye-catching first point is his use of ma'rifa to verbalize particular knowledge instead of 'ilm, which connotes universal knowledge. Moreover, Bābartī's student Molla Fanārī argues that tafsīr is not a science as that term is commonly understood, and thus prefers to use ma'rifa instead of 'ilm when defining tafsīr. According to Bābartī, tafsīr is a tool by which the things (shay') connected to the Qur'ān can be known (ma'rifa). 31 In addition to his definition, he quotes from Rāḍī: "Tafsīr is a science by which the will of Allah the almighty in the Noble Qur'ān is searched. It is qualified with tafsīr and ta'wīl." He criticizes this quotation as follows:
This declaration is void, because a mufassir searches the meanings of the Qur'ān by means of both riwāyah and dirāyah, and not the will of Allah the almighty. Indeed, the will of Allah cannot be cognised. Another reason for this mistake is that dividing a thing into itself and into other elements [at the same time is impossible].
32
Bābartī distinguishes between searching for the meanings of the Qur'ān and the will of Allah the Almighty. In the exegetical field, research is based on the former because the divine will cannot be cognised. Later, Molla Fanārī will bring up the same explanation. 33 The second objection opposes the separation between tafsīr and ta'wīl. Bābartī argues that considering tafsīr an integral part of "itself" (which is again tafsīr) is problematic.
Taftāzānī participated in this discussion primarily by using the ideas of Tībī, Qazwīnī, Rāzī, and Bābartī in his own annotation. If we consider this work, along with Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī's criticisms of Taftāzānī, one can argue that the shar-ḥ-ḥāshiya tradition now faces a turning point because the beginning of this tradition of annotating the commentaries of al-Kashshāf can largely be traced back to the works of Taftāzānī and Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī.
Taftāzānī concisely explains Zamakhsharī's arguments on the nature of science of Qur'ānic exegesis at the literal level and gives important preferences. Rāzī, similar to Pahliwān and Bābartī, also introduces the definition of tafsīr, into which he inserts the phrase "the science of tafsīr": "Tafsīr is a science that investigates the circumstances of Allah's words in relation with signifying the will [of Allah] . This science embraces [both] tafsīr connected to riwāyah and ta'wīl connected to dirāyah".
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This definition is closer to Rāzī's than it is to Bābartī's, who considers tafsīr to be a partial sphere of knowledge. However, Taftāzānī interferes in his predecessor's definition by stating that one engaged in exegetical activity cannot directly search for Allah's will in the Qur'ān, a view that Rāzī also holds. Instead, the divine word is investigated in terms of its signification to the will. As Tashkopruzāda would confirm later on, 36 the new definition transforms Rāzī's definition into a condition of "in terms of… (min haythu…)".
37 Subsequent to this definition, Taftāzānī describes ma'ānī as a science by which one learns how to establish speech according to contextual requirements (ḥāl), and bayān as science by which the circumstances of tashbīḥ (simile), majāz (tropes), and kināya (parable) are explored. He qualifies tafsīr with both of them based upon his argument that the Qur'ān's secrets and inimitability can be cognized only by knowing both.
38
In the line of annotation tradition to al-Kashshāf, Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī follows Taftāzānī. Although Jurjānī largely grounds his annotation on Taftāzānī's work, he nevertheless frequently criticises the latter's preferences. These criticisms in particular gained acceptance, and thus many works have been produced to defend these two scholars. In his section on the nature of the science of tafsīr, Jurjānī offered condenses information that both encapsulates former opinions and gives detailed information about a number of other subjects, such as the distinction between science ('ilm) and craft (ṣanā'ah). By showing that tafsīr embraces both divine knowledge and practical rules, he argues that it can be indicated through one of these names. However, it is better to call it a science because that particular term is more widespread and respected. 39 In his work, and without referring to the source, Jurjānī cites Taftāzānī's definition of tafsīr and subsequently states his opinions about both the tafsīr-ta'wīl division and tafsīr by means of reasoning. Tafsīr is a science by which the words of Allah the almighty's circumstances are explored in terms of indicating His will. It splits into [two as] tafsīr and ta'wīl. Tafsīr holds that the one can be comprehend only by reports, which means that it is connected to riwāyah -for instance, the occasion of the revelation and qiṣaṣ (stories of the prophets in the Qur'ān). Ta'wīl, however, can be comprehend via the principles of the Arabic language, which means it is connected to dirāyah. In the former, it is [a significant] mistake to comment [about anything] without a report. Again, in the latter, commenting [about anything] by relying on personal opinion is [considered a] mistake. This will not change, even if the person reaches the right conclusion on both occasions. Deducing meanings by principles of the language is considered a virtue and perfection. 40 In this section, he repeats Taftāzānī's definition of tafsīr and explains the tafsīr-ta'wīl divide at length. In his annotation, we come across other information about the nature of the science of tafsīr beyond the above explanation.
Majduddīn al-Fīrūzābādī (d. 817/1415), the author of Nughbat al-Raṣṣāf min Ḥutba al-Kashshāf, follows Jurjānī. His annotation, which is limited to al-Kashshāf's introduction, nevertheless stands out due to the information it provides in terms of lexicography and linguistics. Fīrūzābādī, in contrast to the other commentators, analysed the phrase "the science of tafsīr" only from the perspective of linguistics:
Tafsīr is bayān. It is used in the form of "fasarahū-yafsiruhū-yafsuruhū-fasran". This is similar to the examples "ḍarabahū-yaḍribuhū and naṣarahū-yanṣuruhū". [The muḍārī form] of fasarahū is yafsiruhū, it means "he explained". Later, this word entered common useage and the meaning became recognized whenever it was used.
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He explains the other parts of the discussion on the nature of the science of tafsīr from the same perspective. Although his style is unique, his work provides no important information on this discussion.
The next commentator, Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār, contributes to the literature on al-Kashshāf with his Muḥākamāt, which reviews Jamāladdīn al-Aksarāyī's objections to Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī's annotation, and with his own annotation of alKashshāf. Because Aksarāyī does not object to al-Rāzī's opionins on the nature of the science of tafsīr in his 'Itirāḍāt, Abdalkarīm's Muḥākamāt says nothing about it.
In his annotation, Abdalkarīm nicely reflects the former discussions on this subject by quoting frequently from Tībī, Qazwīnī, and Bābartī and using Taftāzānī and Jurjānī's annotations. His investigation is presented in the section related to our subject. While mentioning the discussion on tafsīr based on reasoning and tafsīr-ta'wīl, Abdalkarīm mostly narrates word-for-word Tībī's view (stated above). 42 While summarizing the authors' statements; he quotes from Rāzī's expression (mentioned above). 43 His definition of tafsīr is taken word-for-word from Jurjānī's annotation.
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Here, after Abdalkarīm introduces Jurjānī's definition as if it were his own (it is actually taken from Taftāzānī): "Tafsīr is a science by which the circumstances of Allah's divine speech are searched in terms of indicating His will". He transmits Rāzī's definition and Bābartī's 45 objection to it: (1) during the exegetical process, the meanings of the Qur'ān, as opposed to the will of Allah the almighty, are searched for, as the divine will cannot be known, and (2) the division of a thing into itself and into other elements [is impossible]. Abdalkarīm responds to both objections:
To the first objection, we could respond by saying: According to the scholars of bayān, the meaning of murād/the will is: the one who understood from the indicated and sorted meanings of the speech, which can be derived from the qualifications given by the means of the science of ma'ānī. Obviously, in relation to the meaning stated just above, scholars can completely comprehend the will of Allah the almighty in the Qur'ān -all except for the mutashābihāt [unclear/resembling] verses.
[Indeed] the debate is over mutashābihāt. As the lexicographers argue, [the term] will/intention is a thing that the speaker intends by his utterance. According to some scholars, this can be known through the reports of the Prophet (p. b. u. h.) Some scholars exclude the mutashābih; others include it. Maybe the source of this doubt is that according to some the Mu'tazilites, it is impossible for a human being to comprehend completely the will in Allah's words, because this would mean [that he understood] all of the intentions and aims [which is not possible], as [mentioned in] the report of Alī (r.a.).
[Even] the commentary of ṣura al-Fātiha involves many sciences. But this is only an apprehension, because this statement of the commentator does not completely encapsulate the whole context of the will. On the contrary, [this is about] investigating the will, and you know what this means. Other than that, it is possible to comprehend the complete will of the speech of Allah the almighty. This is a literal debate, because those who claim that comprehending is possible with "the whole [context of] intention" seek to consider the things clear in the indication of words in terms of adding and extracting according to the context. These indications are covered by the science of bayān. Otherwise, the aim is not to cover all of the will and purpose.
46 Therefore, the author of Miftāḥ [Sakkākī] says: "In our argumentation, we draw the attention to the one who [aims to] completely grasps the will of al-Ḥakīm the almighty is extremely dependent upon both sciences [ma'ānī and bayān]. What a shame for those who dive into tafsīr [the exegetical activity], although they are short of both sciences." The response to his second objection is: It is the science of tafsīr that is divided, not the tafsīr itself. This [argument] does not generate the conclusion that a thing is divided both into itself and its external elements. 47 Above, Abdalkarīm examines Bābartī's view concerning the divine intention by highlighting the lexicographers' perceptions and balāgha on the will. In short, he claims that each word, which can be linguistically and literary compiled, can be understood as long as they have acquired the tools of the science of balāgha. He contends that Bābartī's second argument is mistaken because he does not distinguish the science of tafsīr from tafsīr. If this distinction is comprehended, then the problem will automatically be solved.
After Abdalkarīm narrates Taftāzānī's definition of the sciences of ma'ānī and bayān without naming him, he complains about Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī's long useless discussion on this subject. 48 Abdalkarīm clarifies why ma'ānī and bayān is peculiar to tafsīr by making use of Taftāzānī's annotation. As opposed to the other commentators, he draws attention to the purpose of compiling these two sciences is the Qur'ān.
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The next commentator who embraces the section on the nature of the science of tafsīr is Musannifak, a native of Khorosān who travelled to Anatolia. After working as a mudarris in Konya, Bursa, and Edirne, he moved to Istanbul at the invitation of Mahmut Pasha, one of Sultan Fātih's viziers, and spent the rest of his life in there. 50 In his annotation of al-Kashshāf, which is one of the most detailed, we can find almost all and even more of the discussions, all of which he verifies before presenting his own opinions. As one can observe in the scholars who come from the eastern and western parts of the Islamic world, he also defends Taftāzānī against Jurjānī's critics.
Musannifak is interesting because he dwells on the distinction between science and craft in detail. 51 He objects to Tībī's claim that prohibiting reasoning in exegetical activity is extreme and says that he will explain his arguments later. 52 The most remarkable of his views appear in his annotation on the subject of "the science of tafsīr". He cites Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī's definition of tafsīr and the expositions related to it as if they are his own. He adds only the last sentence, after which he devotes considerable space to this discussion: Tafsīr is the science by which Allah the almighty's will is searched for in the Noble Qur'ān. It is qualified to two parts: tafsīr and ta'wīl. Because the meanings of the Qur'ān are explained by the transmissions either by the Prophet (s.a.w.s) or his Companions (r.a.), this is tafsīr. If they are explained by the principles of the Arabic language, then this is ta'wīl. In short, tafsīr is related to riwāyah, and ta'wīl is related to dirāyah. A dignified commentator has voiced these views, and another commentator, who made a name for himself with his skills and mastery of the science in the land of Rūm, has objected to him from these angles… 53 In this quotation, the "dignified commentator" refers to Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī, and the objector who is described by the phrase "his skills and mastery of the science in the land of Rūm" is Molla Fanārī. Because the latter's annotation to alKashshāf starts with the interpretation of Ṣura al-Baqara, it does not include the part that deals with this particular discussion. Instead, he placesthe Musannifak's objection in the introduction of Ṣura al-Fātiḥa in his tafsīr: 'Ayn al-A'yān. Fanārī challenges Rāzī's and Taftāzānī's definition of tafsīr, whereas Musannifak responds to him with a long quotation from Fanārī's objections.
As Musannifak reports, Molla Fanārī contends that Rāḍī's definition (i.e., tafsīr is a science by which the will of Allah the almighty is searched for in the Noble Qur'ān) does not touch all of the bases and thus does not involve all of the subjects of tafsīr. This definition emphasises the search for the divine will. However, the analysis based upon this science can be also based upon the circumstances of the wordings, such as, in the field of qirā'a (e.g., maliki and māliki), or in the article on which words are nāsikh-mansūkh, the circumstances of the revelation, or the revelation order of the wordings and whether they are categorised as Makkī or Madanī. His definition does not completely cover all of these points, although all of them are related to this exegetical activity. Furthermore, Rāzī's definition does not exclude subjects that are irrelevant to tafsīr. In fact, Allah's will about the decisive subjects of faith in the Qur'ān is analysed in the science of kalām, and His will about practical subjects is analysed in the science of fiqh. In this case, the intellectual search for the will of Allah the almighty is not only confined to tafsīr. After mentioning and criticising Rāzī's definition of tafsīr, Molla Fanārī examines the reviewed version of Taftāzānī's definition that, according to him, states: "Tafsīr is a science that searches the circumstances of Allah's word in terms of signification to will". In this way, he seeks to solve the problems resulting from Rāḍī's definition, such as not embracing the things that belong to tafsīr and embracing the things that do not belong to it. The addition of "the circumstances of wording" includes the subjects that do not appear in the former definition. The condition of "in terms of signification of wording to the will" excludes the other sciences that examine the divine will as it appears in the Qur'ān, such as fiqh, kalām, and balāgha. Although these sciences also search for the circumstances of the divine will, they do not analyse such things from the perspective of searching utterly for the signification of the divine word, but rather according to the different perspectives related to their field.
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Although Taftāzānī did remove some of the problems from Rāzī's definition, his own definition has its own problematic aspects. For example, his definition also excluded various elements related to the science of tafsīr. If the research for the circumstances of Allah's words is confined to the will's determination, many notions related to qirā'a will be automatically excluded, among them tafhkhīm (pronouncing rough or thick), imāla (reciting with an open vowel), madd (prolonging the vowel's sound), qaṣr (shortening the vowel), and iṭāla (prolonged pronouncitation). In other words, his definition leaves out the notions of qirā'a, which do not interfere with the word's meaning. Molla Fanārī foresees the probable response to this objection. At this point, we could argue that qirā'a is considered a separate science and that Taftāzānī might have introduced his definition after treating qirā'a as a separate science. According to Molla Fanārī, this would mean that Taftāzānī's annotation contradicts the relevant content of al-Kashshāf. In fact al-Kashshāf in the context of tafsīr, analysed subjects unrelated to meanings. For instance, it mentions two different pronunciations of alḥamdulillah: one with two ḍammas (u; alḥamdulullah) and another with two kasras (i; ) alḥamdilillah).
56 Or, he explains how two hamzas can be read differently, 57 "a-anzartahum".
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According to Fanārī, Taftāzānī's definition also failed to exclude non-exegetical elements because he did not qualify the notion of "will". Taftāzānī's definition, namely, that "tafsīr is a science by which the circumstances of Allah's words are 55 Molla Fanārī, 4; Musannifak, f. 20 b . 56 Zamakhsharī, I, 10. 57 Ibid., I, 48. 58 Molla Fanārī, 4; Musannifak, searched in terms of the indicating will", also does not qualify this notion. If the author is trying to use "will" without confining it, then his analysis of it will enter the sphere of balāgha. Saying that "will" is qualified by the notion of "divine" gives rise to another problem, because the science of tafsīr does not analyse the divine will in itself (in nafs al-amr). In fact, tafsīr is usually based on āḥād hkabar or on dirāyah linked to the Arabic language. As both of these are considered ẓannī (speculative, ambiguous) knowledge, everyone understands it in his or her own way.
Therefore, leading scholars advised qualifying one's intention when reciting the kalima shahāda in order to avoid any confusion. The divine will in nafs al-amr cannot be revealed by the mufassirs. If one claims that the divine will means the mufassir's understanding of the concept of "His will", then two problems arise: (1) the science of tafsīr should change according to each mufassir and (2) it can be easily deduced that the first meaning that comes to mind is the divine will in nafs al-amr.
59
As one can see, Molla Fanārī argues that the notion of will "in terms of indicating the will", fails to exclude the science of balāgha from the definition. However, he contends that this problem would not be solved even if the notion of will were qualified with divine because the divine cannot be determined via the limited search within the exegetical activity. In fact, one can only reach some possible meanings regarding the divine will via ta'wīl in the exegetical activity. Fanārī's teacher Bābartī pointed to a similar aspect. While Fanārī argues that the divine will in nafs al-amr cannot be known within the tafsīr framework, his Hanafite teacher, who was a legal theorist, must have influenced him along with the tradition of waḥdat al-wujūd that he adopted. Molla Fanārī's explanations on the definition of tafsīr and his quotations of Musannifak are followed by a third objection to Taftāzānī's definition: in the definition, the notion ma'rifa should be used to express partial (juz'ī) knowledge instead of 'ilm, which is used to indicate infinite (kullī) knowledge. His teacher Bābartī also held this view. Fanārī states that "it is a science" used for methods, principles, and skills toward them, whereas in the science of tafsīr one rarely come across infinite principles based on partial issues. By relying on this, he claims that 'ilm is not to be used in the definition.
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At the end of Musannifak's quotation, Fanārī again targets Rāzī's views on the tafsīr-ta'wīl distinction. Rāzī mentions that tafsīr is separated into two parts by tafsīr (based on riwāyah) and ta'wīl (based on the Arabic language [dirāyah]). Bābartī criticised this view, whereas Taftāzānī, Jurjānī, and other commentators 59 Molla Fanārī, 5; Musannifak, f. 21 a . 60 Molla Fanārī, 5; Musannifak, f. 21 a . adopted it. Fanārī objects to all of these views by claiming that in exegetical activity, one can reach a conclusion by reasoning without depending on either riwāyah or Arabic, because determining one of the possible meanings by reason excludes riwāyah and dirāyah. For instance, saying that what is impossible (mūḥāl) is not subjected to power, while interpreting the Allah the almighty's expression "Allah has power over all things"
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. As a matter of fact, no report or a grammatical principle deals this point. 62 Thus, Fanārī clearly disputes the claim that Arabic is the only source of dirāyah.
After this, Fanārī introduces a new definition, one that does not involve the problems that he mentions: tafsīr is "to know (ma'rifa), in proportion to human power, the circumstances of Allah's words in terms of being the Qur'ān and of the indication to the known or supposed-to-be known regarding Allah's will."
63 "In terms of the Qur'ān" includes the subjects related to qirā'a; "the will of Allah" qualifies the will, meaning that the science of balāgha, which analyses only the wording's intention, is excluded; "indication to the known" includes absolute meanings based on riwāyah and reason; "supposed-to-be-known" involves meanings based on āḥād reports and possible meanings based on reason; "in terms of indication" leaves out other sciences (e.g., fiqh, kalām, analysing the Qur'ān from different aspects); "the circumstances of Allah's wording" includes all kinds of research from the perspective of qirā'a and other Qur'ānic sciences; "in proportion to human power" emphasises that the knowledge contained in the tafsīr is not the essence, but rather an outcome, of one's limited human potential; and, finally, using "to know" (ma'rifa) instead of 'ilm refers to the idea that tafsīr is not a science, upon which all infinite principles are imposed. 64 Mussanifak, who was not interested in this definition, cites his critics one by one and then begins his response without even mentioning Fanārī's definition. Apart from the reviewed definition of Taftāzānī, he defends Rāzī's definition as unproblematic. Another attention-grabbing point is his use of offensive terms for Fanārī (i.e., the scholar from Rūm) and Bābartī (i.e., the scholar from Egypt).
Musannifak begins his explanations by proclaiming Fanārī's objections to be void on the grounds that he could not comprehend that searching for the divine will differs from achieving results with respect to it. The word being analysed either has a single meaning or possible conflicting meanings. In the former the intention is declared, whereas in the latter only one of the intended meanings is declared. Thus, the will is revealed in both cases. What kind of means are used in this process and whether they are useful or not have nothing to do with these investigations of the will. Thus, they have to be evaluated separately. In this case, the objection against Rāḍī's and Taftāzānī's saying that "what is examined in tafsīr is the will" is unjustified. Indeed, the analysis of the verses being Makkī-Madanī, nāṣikh-manṣūkh, identifying the occasions of revelation, space and time, and other subjects are included in the scope of examining Allah's will. Therefore, in some respects the will comes into light with these approaches because all of them contribute to and have an effect on declaring, completing, and investigating the will. In this case, when Rāzī says that he analysed the will of Allah the almighty in his tafsīr, this does not mean that he left out other Qur'ānic sciences and other subjects of tafsīr. In fact, he indirectly includes all of the subjects. 65 Musannifak thinks that Taftāzānī's revision of Rāzī's definition of tafsīr is therefore unnecessary because there is no need to change "analysing the will of Allah the almighty" to "analysing the circumstances of the wording of Allah in terms of signifying His will".
Musannifak claims that Rāzī's definition embodies fiqh and kalām is obviously void on the grounds that both sciences obtain their explanations regarding the intention of Allah the almighty in the Qur'ān from tafsīr, the matters of which belong to the principles of both sciences.
66 By claiming this, Musannifak argues that the divine intention in the theological (kalāmī) and practical aspects ('amālī) appearing in the Qur'ān are indeed obtained from the science of tafsīr. Consequently, fiqh and kalām use this given knowledge.
Fanārī asserts that Taftāzānī's definition leaves out qirā'a and other matters related to wording. He remarks that if Taftāzānī considers qirā'a an individual field, then he contradicts Zamakhsharī, who approaches the analysis of wording as a part of tafsīr. According to Musannifak, this assertion is absurd. 67 First of all, the subjects regarding wording cannot be considered part of exegetical activity, for it is natural for tafsīr to bring matters of other sciences to the table. The matter about the wording in al-Kashshāf should be considered in this manner. Moreover, any feature in the word somehow reflects its meaning. The aforesaid matters related to wording contribute to declaring the will and completing the meaning. According to Musannifak, Fanārī's claim that the divine will cannot be known in its essence is incorrect. The aim of using "Allah the almighty's will" is to reach that will by analysing the evidence through riwāyah and dirāyah. If we can determine their accuracy, then there will be no debate that it is His will in nafs al-amr. Also, this would never require that the will be diverse, as the varieties of interpretation and perception produced by the science of tafsīr, for the valid point is the species-truth (al-ḥaqīqa al-nawiyya), not the people and their attributions.
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Fanārī remarks that the riwāyah-dirāyah division is not inclusive because it excludes the idea of determining one of the possibilities by reason. According to Musannifak, this objection is more invalid because mentioning Arabic's grammatical rules as dirāyah is only possible through representing some of the aspects of ta'wīl, not because ta'wīl is confined by Arabic's rules. The leading scholar of the land of Rūm has failed to take the example as the main (aṣl). 70 Musannifak says that a more unusual objection came from a person who had made a name for himself with his skills in Egypt, namely, Bābartī, who also objected to Rāḍī's tafsīr-ta'wīl division and proclaimed the forthcoming two points invalid. According to him, this division means dividing something into itself and into other elements. Again, a mufassir investigates the Qur'ān's meanings either by riwāyah or riwāyah and dirāyah. In other words, he is not searching for the will of Allah the almighty, for this cannot be known. 71 Musannifak does not even respond to these last objections, but rather announces that he despises the scholars of Rūm (i.e., Fanārī) and Egypt (i.e., Bābartī): "Let's, oh smart gemeinschaft, look at the land of Rūm and Egypt and see their skills! Imagine their situation when they make use of the sciences ('ulūm)!" 72 After this, Musannifak widely embraces the issue of tafsīr-ta'wīl and rejects Tībī's views on tafsīr with reasoning and Molla Fanārī's three objections regarding tafsīr-ta'wīl by reviewing them. He first cites the reports about prohibiting tafsīr with reasoning and the scholars' views related to it. Subsequently, he prioritizes those reports and views on the necessity of ta'wīl. According to Musannifak, the way to bring the reports together is to divide the science of tafsīr into tafsīr (i.e., reports about prohibiting tafsīr with reasoning) and ta'wīl (i.e., reports that support the use of reason). Because Tībī could not exactly understand this point, he considered Zamakhsharī's criticism of imitators too extreme. He likened this to Wāḥidī's extremism, namely, that tafsīr with reasoning is forbidden. 73 According to Musannifak, neither Zamakhsharī's nor Wāḥidī's views are extreme, for one concerns ta'wīl and the other one concerns tafsīr. 74 Musannifak deals lastly with Molla Fanārī's objections. According to Musannifak's claim, the pre-eminent person of Rūm's first objection is against Imam Baghawī and other mufassirs' views regarding the tafsīr-ta'wīl division. According to Fanārī, Baghawī is wrong when he states: Tafsīr is the declaration of occasions of the revelations, situations of the verses, qiṣāṣ, and the communities meant in the verses, which can be obtained only by hearing. On the other hand, tawīl means to give one of the possible meanings to the word in the line with siyāq and sibāq, the Qur'ān and Sunna. A word with only one meaning, which is assigned for this meaning and is used with this one meaning, and there is no report about it, falls beyond these two classifications. 75 Musannifak declares this objection invalid on the grounds that the intention of the first part of Baghawī's statement is related to hearing and transmission. The second part points to dirāyah and rules. However, in both of these he mentions the things that are the clearest in terms of their category. Besides this the word, which is determined by the language and has one intended meaning, is located within the category of tafsīr. The lexical meaning of words is based on hearing (al-sam'). Moreover, it is superior to those things based on hearing because others come after them. If the word with single meaning is used figuratively, the activity of comprehending it will fall under ta 'wīl. 76 According to Fanārī's other objection, one cannot accurately claim that tafsīr is linked to riwāyah, and ta'wīl to dirāyah because this relation can be broken via a word with a single meaning. When the word is assigned for this one meaning, and when this meaning is intended, declaring its literal meaning (ḥaqīqa) relies neither on riwāyah nor dirāyah. 77 Musannifak, as stated before, limits himself to pointing out the incorrectness of this objection. 78 As we can see in the previous example, he evaluates Fanārī's remarks on the article of lexical meaning regarding riwāyah within the framework of tafsīr.
Fanārī's other objection is that the scholars' statements are invalid on the grounds that tafsīr is the result of riwāyah, and ta'wīl is the result of dirāyah. Since 73 Tībī, I, [649] [650] 5; Musannifak, f. 22 b . 76 Musannifak, f. 22 b . 77 Molla Fanārī, [5] [6] Musannifak, f. 22 b . 78 Musannifak, f. 22 b . it is possible to use khabar al-wāḥid in tafsīr and to apply ta'wīl by referring to the clear texts (al-nuṣuṣ al-muḥkama) with absolute evidence, tafsīr is inferior to ta'wīl. But since this idea would definitely contradict the consensus, it is void. This claim can be recovered only when it is attributed to Imam Māturidī's words: "Tafsīr is a declaration, which testifies to the riwāyah. Thus, tafsīr speaks with knowledge, whereas other sciences speak with opinions". 79 Musannifak does not respond to this last objection; rather, he concludes this discussion as follows: "The (last) three objections belong to pre-eminent person from Rūm. His words are stigmatised with condemnation and corruption. From this can be seen the depth of his knowledge of the sciences! Here, we went around the bushes, because we saw how slippery the expert's arguments were".
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Given that Musannifak is from Khorosān, he clearly has no positive opinions about the scholars from Egypt and Rūm. This might possibly be because when he came to Anatolia he found himself in a debate, the traces of which can be clearly observed in his criticisms of Bābartī and Molla Fanārī. Another point that captures our attention is that he disagrees with and rejects all ten of Fanārī objections beforehand. However, the way he represents his own objections is unconvincing.
If we shortly evaluate his objections, as Fanārī discusses, we have to undertake a much broader research than just analysing the intention within the various tafsīr works. Despite this, Musannifak had to apply to ta'wīl when he claimed that all exegetical activity is related to analysing the will, whereas Fanārī's offer to replace "murād" with "the circumstances which are related to the wording of Allah", removes the need for ta'wīl.
Moreover, Musannifak failed to prove his claim that the analysis of qirā'a is not included by tafsīr and that every analysis of the words contributed to determining the will. His view of qirā'a as an individual science can be accepted; however, looking through the tafsīr tradition reveals that the analysis of qirā'a is considered part of exegetical activity. At this point, Fanārī's decision to insert this particular analysis into the definition of tafsīr with the condition "because it is the Qur'ān", is correct. But his claim that each analysis of a word helps determine the will is unjustified. In fact, the tafsīr literature contains many chapters on qirā'a and linguistics, which only analyses the words' tonal attributes.
Fanārī's following argument also deserves our attention: Without any qualification, the will cannot be analysed in the exegetical activity because doing so would 79 Molla Fanārī, 6; Musannifak, f. 22 b . 80 Musannifak, f. 22 b . remove the boundaries between tafsīr, fiqh, kalām, and Sufism. On the other hand, Musannifak claims that the divine will in the verses are determined by engaging in this very activity and that other sciences (e.g., fiqh and kalām) both utilise the results of this activity and acquire principles from it. Ta'wīl, in its capacity as a tool for unveiling the divine will, is not applied just by moving from Qur'ānic words to their indications. This fact renders Musannifak's claim controversial. Fanārī's attitude to this topic can be summarised as follows: As ta'wīl occurs through various information, sources, and methodologies, tafsīr is the beneficiary of other sciences' methodologies, principles, and data. In this formulation, tafsīr is the one that takes the principles and supplies those principels. Within the distinction of tafsīr-ta'wīl, tafsīr's status as a principle supplier is related solely to tafsīr. Within the framework of tafsīr, the science of tafsīr provides to other sciences a set of common data, namely, the language, riwāyah, and meanings obtained from the pre-exegetical process by historical data. Moreover, other sciences use the Qur'ān as the informative source in their attempt to reveal the divine will from the verses via their subjects, informative sources, and methodologies. At this point, tafsīr as a science that examines the Qur'ān in a context limited to the indication of words and draws apart from other sciences that use the Qur'ān as a source of information. Although the methodological effort cannot be observed in tafsīr, the contribution and the data produced by other sciences play a role in determining the ta'wīl process in the exegetical activity. 81 Musannifak rejects Fanārī's argument "that the divine will cannot be known in its essence", which relies on his contemplation in the sphere of epistemology and metaphysics, without examining it deeply. Exactly what this argument denotes within the sphere of epistemological and metaphysical discussions is another subject. However, Fanārī confines himself to drawing attention to the defect in cognition and methodology and adds "or supposed-to-be" to the expression "to be known as the divine will", which strengthens the definition.
Fanārī's opposition to riwāyah and dirāyah is also important. Before his annotation, all other sharḥs and ḥāshiyas claimed that dirāyah is based on Arabic's grammatical rules. However, as he states, dirāyah can also be made operational without relying any linguistic rules. For instance, while interpreting (ta'wīl) the verses on faith, rational evidence is not always attributed to linguistic rules. It can be clearly seen that scholars are concerned about limiting reasoning by basing dirāyah upon the Arabic language. However, this limitation does not reflect the actual case. Al- though Musannifak agrees with Fanārī on this point, he continues to challenge him by claiming that dirāyah based on linguistics is the example for dirāyah. Therefore, he accuses him of assuming the example to be the principal.
Fanārī explains that a word's literal meaning within the framework of lexicography is neither part of riwāyah nor dirāyah, a claim that can be considered reasonable. Although Musannifak views lexicography as part of riwāyah, he prefers not to investigate this contention in any depth. Even if we can consider the articles of lexicography part of riwāyah, we cannot say that they are within the scope of tafsīr. In fact, riwāyah in the context of tafsīr means the information reported from the Prophet (p. b. u. h.) and his Companions (r.a.).
We should emphasize that Fanārī has already responded to the forthcoming objections regarding his conception of tafsīr-ta'wīl. 82 Musannifak either did not see these responses or just ignored them. Fanārī's definition of tafsīr, as well as his ideas on tafsīr-ta'wīl, are deserving of attention, and yet Musannifak rejected all of these in advance without detailing his reasons for doing so.
At this point, we have again researched chronologically whether the debate is continued by the following shāriḥs and muḥashshīs. Clearly, this debate followed the line of Rāzī-Pahliwān-Bābartī-Taftāzānī-Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār-Fanārī. For instance, after Musannifak Ali Kushchu (d. 897/1474), who came to Istanbul from the East at the invitation of Sultan Mehmed, neither broadly discusses the nature of the science of tafsīr nor mentions Taftāzānī's definition of tafsīr in his annotation of Taftāzānī's al-Kashshāf. 83 Following him, Hasan Chalabi b. Mehmed Shah al-Fanārī's annotation (Fanārī's grandson) of al-Kashshāf arouses our interest due to its affinity with Fanārī. However, a close examination of his writings on the nature of the science of tafsīr 84 reveals that he does not get involved in the discussion, but prefers to confine himself to the definition of tafsīr first introduced by Taftāzānī and then by Jurjānī and to quoting the discussions on the tafsīr-ta'wīl from the latter's annotation. 85 Hasan Chalabi inventively explains what it means to qualify tafsīr with ma'ānī and bayān on the basis of two possibilities. 86 In the following period, Muḥyiddīn Hatibzāda (d. 901/1495) Ibn Kamāl Pasha (d. 940/1534) also wrote an annotation on Jurjānī's work but did not mention the discussion on the nature of the science of tafsīr.
92 Tashkopruzāda Aḥmad Efendi (d. 968/1561), in his annotation on Jurjānī's work, emphasizes that his definition is the added-to version of Rāzī's definition. He further opines that "it is the science by which the will of Allah the almighty is searched in the Qur'ān" corresponds to the condition "in terms of (min ḥaythu)" in Jurjānī's definition. 93 Moreover, he responds to Bābartī's criticism of regarding the division of tafsīr-ta'wīl as dividing one thing at the same time into itself and into other elements. He argues that it is not tafsīr that is divided, but rather the science of tafsīr. 94 We would like to remind readers that the origin of this response is Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār.
Hāmid b. 'Alī al-'Imādī (d. 1171/1758), who commented on the part about the nature of the science of tafsīr, also quotes from Taftāzānī and Jurjānī's definition and briefly mentions Rāzī's views on the tafsīr-ta'wīl by naming him. 95 Again, this source does not go beyond the existing discussions on this subject.
Conclusion
This article discussed the chronological analyses of the important sharḥs and ḥāshi-yas, including the debate on the nature of the science of tafsīr in al-Kashshāf's introduction. This research is based on more than twenty sources. The annotations to al-Kashshāf were written in relation to each other in a historical development process. Based on this process, this article argues that we can reveal the important debate process by embracing, both chronologically and comparatively, the literature contained within the Islamic intellectual tradition.
The commentators of al-Kashshāf (i.e., Chāpardī, Tībī, Kazwīnī, and Yamanī) do not approach the topic on the nature of the science of tafsīr as a theoretical debate, although all of them comment on it. Among the commentators on alKashshāf, Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī serves as the debate's milestone, for his definition of tafsīr and his arguments on the division of tafsīr and ta'wīl become a source for the subsequent commentators. The first one to review to Rāḍī's definition, Alāud-92 Ibn Kamāl, Süleymaniye Library, Cârullah nr. 199 dīn 'Alī Pahliwān, completes Rāzī's definition so that it covers the ta'wīl process. Bābartī then challenges his definition and introduces his own by replacing "'ilm" with "ma'rifa", opposes Rāzī's claim that tafsīr is a means to search the divine will, and also rejects the tafsīr-ta'wīl division on the grounds that this means dividing the same thing into itself and into other elements. After Bābartī, Taftāzānī reviews Rāzī's definition and argues that in tafsīr, the circumstances of Allah's wordings are searched, not His will or the indications of these circumstances to the will. Jurjānī accepts this approach. The next commentator, Fīrūzābādī, confines himself to the linguistic analyses of the notion of tafsīr, whereas Abdalkarīm b. Abdaljabbār targets Bābartī and supports Quṭbuddīn al-Rāzī. Molla Fanārī, on the other hand, challenges both Rāzī's and Taftāzānī's definitions and introduces his own. However, Musannifak both cites and then objects to Fanārī's views and criticises Bābartī's explanations. One of the remarkable cases is that Musannifak despises Fanārī by calling him "the scholar from Rūm" and also Bābartī by referring to him as "the scholar from Egypt." As someone who travelled from Khorosān to Anatolia and who taught at Konya, Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul, he expressed a truly insulting attitude toward these leading figures. This attitude should be investigated from the scope of historical approach.
The debate on the nature of the science of tafsīr reached another level with Musannifak's objection to Fanārī. Although his critics draw the attention of researchers, we can say that they are not well justified. Fanārī's objections to Rāzī's and Taftāzānī's definitions, as well as to their explanations on the tafsīr-ta'wīl division, remained powerful even after Musannifak's refutation. Despite all of these objections and debates, the arguments of both scholars can be deepened in order to establish two intellectual approaches to the science of tafsīr and the nature of the ta'wīl process. However, this argument is beyond the scope of this article, which only seeks to demonstrate this debate's historical developmental process. In terms of further research, we could suggest a comparative study between Fanārī and Musannifak focused on their understanding of ta'wīl.
After Musannifak, other leading commentators made important contributions to the debate on the nature of the science of tafsīr, such as Ali Qūshjī, Hasan Chalabi, Hitāī, Hatibzāda, Ḥafīḍ al-Taftāzānī, Karamānī, Ibn Kamāl Pasha, Tashkopruzā-da, and 'Imādī. However, their contributions did not occur within the tense debates in which Musannifak had been involved. Indeed, they lived at a time when writing annotations of Bayḍāwī was the thing to do. Hence, most of them preferred to write annotations of the present annotations instead of writing directly on al-Kashshāf.
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